This study provides new estimates of demand for employer-sponsored health insurance, using the 1997-2001 linked Household Component-Insurance Component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). Our focus is on households' decisions to take up coverage through a worker's employer. We found a significant inverse relationship between the out-of-pocket premium and the probability of taking up coverage, with the price effect considerably larger when we used instrumental variables methods to account for endogenous out-of-pocket premiums. Additionally, workers in families with more children eligible for Medicaid were less likely to take up coverage.
In 2007, approximately 59% of the nonelderly population in the United States received health insurance through their places of employment, either as workers or dependents (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2008) . While employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) remains the primary institution through which the nonelderly obtain coverage, there is growing concern about its long-term viability. In the past several years, the rates at which employers offer health insurance and employees take up offered coverage have declined (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006) .
Estimates from the 2006 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) suggest that approximately 165 million nonelderly individuals reside in households with access to ESI through at least one employer source. About 36 million of these are in dual-earner households with two offers of ESI coverage; almost all of these households take up coverage under at least one ESI policy. Of the 129 million individuals in households with one offer of ESI, approximately 9.8 million, or 8%, turn down their offer of coverage. Based on our analysis of the 2006 MEPS Household Component, approximately 4.2 million of these individuals are uninsured. 1 One reason why households that have an offer of health insurance may not take it is the out-of-pocket premium. The percentage of workers whose employers require an out-ofpocket premium has grown over time, with estimates from the MEPS Insurance Component suggesting that over 78% of privatesector employees who enroll in single-coverage ESI pay a contribution and 89.3% of those with family coverage do so (see http:// www.meps.ahrq.gov/ 2008). Even though the average percentage of the total premium paid by employees has remained fairly stable, the dollar amount has increased as a result of growth in health care spending. In 2008, the average annual out-of-pocket premium for a single-coverage preferred provider organization was $731 (15% of the total premium) and $3,344 (26% of the total premium) for family coverage; in 1999, the respective out-ofpocket premiums (inflated to 2008 dollars) were $493 and $2,120 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2008 , 1999 .
Given these payments, some employees may turn down ESI because the out-of-pocket premium is greater than the expected value of the offered coverage. This decision may be particularly evident among households in which some members are eligible for low-cost or free insurance, such as Medicaid or the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) (Gruber and Simon 2008) . Other workers who value coverage highly may be unable to afford it given their incomes. This latter group represents a key target population for federal and state policymakers considering initiatives to reduce the number of working uninsured through direct premium subsidies or indirect tax subsidies and credits.
Understanding households' premium sensitivity is a key consideration for evaluating the potential impact of policies to reduce the number of working uninsured. In recent years, many states have created programs to provide premium assistance to Medicaideligible workers who have an ESI offer as a way to reduce crowd-out and the subsequent financial burden on public insurers. 2 Other states have sought more comprehensive reforms by providing subsidies to broader populations of workers and their dependents, including those who are low income but not Medicaid eligible. 3 We use the 1997-2001 linked Household Component-Insurance Component of the MEPS to investigate the factors affecting households' decisions to take up ESI offers, including the out-of-pocket premium and eligibility of children in the household for public coverage. Additionally, our econometric approach addresses a key methodological issue whereby unobserved factors that influence the decision to take up ESI may be correlated with out-of-pocket premiums, rendering them endogenous.
Literature Review
Prior studies have used a variety of data sources and approaches to investigate the determinants of ESI take-up. Most have found that higher out-of-pocket premiums reduce take-up by statistically significant but small amounts. One challenge that researchers face is that ordinary least squares estimates of the effect of the out-of-pocket premium on the take-up decision may be biased.
Two potential sources of omitted variables may bias the out-of-pocket premium estimates. One is that the plan(s) offered by an employer vary in terms of quality. We expect that higher-quality plans will cost more, both overall and the employee's share, and that quality is attractive to workers. If the model does not fully capture health plan quality and quality is positively correlated with the outof-pocket premium, then the estimated effect of the out-of-pocket premium on take-up will be biased toward zero.
Another source of omitted variables is that the out-of-pocket premium may reflect an employer's strategy for addressing workers' preferences for health insurance. Employers may pay most of the total premium because decisive workers 4 in the firm prefer generous benefits and low premium cost-sharing. Strong worker demand for insurance would be associated with low out-of-pocket premiums, leading to a price elasticity estimate that would be too large if the bias were not corrected. On the other hand, employers may set low out-of-pocket premiums to induce enrollment by workers who lack strong tastes for coverage in order to meet insurers' minimum participation requirements. This factor, which is more likely in small firms, would bias the price elasticity estimate toward zero (similar to the unobserved quality bias). Thus, the overall sign of the bias introduced by these potential sources of endogeneity is indeterminate and requires empirical investigation. 5 In early work, Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997) used a sample of 332 low-income single workers in small firms to estimate the impact of the out-of-pocket premium on the probability of take-up. Treating premiums as exogenous, they found a price elasticity of demand between 2.033 and 2.095, suggesting that employee take-up is not very responsive to a reduction in the out-of-pocket premium. Of course, it is difficult to know how these results generalize to a larger sample or a broader population of workers. Cooper and Vistnes (2003) also focused on the low-wage population, although their unit of analysis was the business establishment. Using the MEPS Insurance Component database, they instrumented the out-ofpocket premium using state-and year-specific average out-of-pocket premiums. However, their instruments were not particularly strong. Moreover, because the analysis was at the establishment level, the authors could not effectively capture the health status or other characteristics of employees' households that might influence demand. They found small overall price effects, but greater price sensitivity for low-wage establishments.
Other studies have utilized natural experiments to address premium endogeneity concerns. Gruber and Washington (2005) took advantage of an exogenous price change that allowed federal workers to pay their out-ofpocket premium with pre-tax dollars beginning in 1994. Using personnel records of federal employees from the 1991-2002 period, they found negligible price effects of 2.022 for families and .028 for single workers. Cutler and Reber (1998) also took advantage of an exogenous change in premiums resulting from Harvard University's decision to implement a voucher-type employer premium contribution. They estimated an out-ofpocket premium elasticity of 21, which is considerably larger than other estimates. 6 While these studies identify the out-of-pocket premium elasticity using exogenous changes in out-of-pocket premiums, the results are limited by focusing on the behavior of workers from employers that are not representative of the U.S. workforce. 7 Polsky et al. (2005) used the Community Tracking Study (CTS) Household Survey to estimate a model of a worker's choice among three options-coverage from his own employer, coverage from an alternative source (public, spouse, or nongroup market), or no coverage. However, the CTS Household Survey does not include information about the premiums faced by a worker at his own employer. As a result, the authors had to impute premiums to workers based on pre-miums at similar firms. 8 They found that workers facing higher out-of-pocket premiums are more likely to be uninsured or covered by an alternative source, and less likely to enroll in a plan offered by their own employer. Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) used the 1996 linked MEPS Household Component-Insurance Component to estimate take-up decisions of 466 single workers and 1,486 workers with families. These data included comprehensive demographic information on all workers as well as the plans available to workers who reported having an ESI offer. The researchers estimated three models of ESI take-up. As a starting point, they estimated a model using observed premiums for workers with offers. They found demand to be price-inelastic, with estimated elasticities of 2.0026 for singles and 2.0443 for families. Next, they used a sample selection technique to impute premiums for workers with offers. This method is typically used when data on one group in the sample (e.g., those who do not take up coverage) are missing. However, in the MEPS, we know the out-of-pocket premiums for both those who take up insurance and those who do not so this strategy does not seem necessary, although the results of Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin help to quantify the effect of using imputation methods to obtain measures of premiums in situations when researchers may not observe them for the entire sample.
The third model by Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin was a bivariate probit that allows errors in the equations for having an offer and taking it up to be correlated. This approach addresses the issue of workers sorting into jobs to obtain their preferred mix of wages and fringe benefits, including health insurance. Bivariate probit would be adequate if the only issue were worker sorting, whereby employees who want health insurance for reasons not observed by the analyst seek out firms that offer it, leading to correlated errors in the offer and take-up equations. But unmeasured ''strong demand'' for health insurance also could lead workers to seek out lower out-of-pocket premiums. Hence, the error in the take-up equation may be correlated with the out-of-pocket premium even in the bivariate probit specification.
However, Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin found that the estimated price effects were not sensitive to either premium imputation or to their method for addressing worker sorting. 9 Finally, Monheit and Vistnes (2005) focused on the effects of out-of-pocket premium requirements and expanded eligibility for Medicaid on demand for ESI from 1987 to 1996. They estimated models for both a household's decision to take up any ESI coverage and the decision to take up a family coverage policy. Estimated elasticities ranged from 2.004 to 2.02, suggesting that changes in the out-of-pocket premium had a small effect on take-up decisions. Additionally, Monheit and Vistnes (2005) found that households in which at least one family member was eligible for Medicaid were 6.6 percentage points less likely to take up ESI family coverage in 1996.
To summarize the literature, most studies have found that the out-of-pocket premium has a significant but small negative effect on ESI take-up. The studies using natural experiments might be expected to yield the most reliable results, yet they have produced the most extreme estimates of price elasticities between 0 (Gruber and Washington 2005) and 21 (Cutler and Reber 1998) . This may be due to the special populations being studied (federal government employees and employees of Harvard University). The study that attempted to address endogeneity related to workers sorting into jobs with offers of coverage (Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin 2001) found price effects similar to studies using observed premiums.
Our analysis builds upon the work of Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) , Monheit and Vistnes (2005) , and others in three ways. First, we use the household as the unit of analysis rather than the worker. This allows us to incorporate characteristics of other household members into the take-up equation. Second, we estimate the take-up model using more years of data. This provides larger sample sizes with which to generate more precise estimates of demand. Finally, we address the issue of endogenous premiums by using two instrumental variables (IV) methods-two-stage least squares (2SLS) and IV probit. However, because we examine only households with an offer of ESI, our results cannot be generalized to all workers.
Model and Analytic Methods
Our conceptual approach is a utility-maximization model, where the i th household's utility depends on health and the consumption of other goods and services. These, in turn, depend on personal characteristics, income, the price of ESI, and expected medical care consumption of a worker and any dependents. We assume a household evaluates the expected utility associated with two options-taking up an ESI offer or not taking up the offer-and selects the one that maximizes expected utility. Households will turn down the offer if they have higher expected utility from one of several possible alternatives, including enrolling in public insurance or remaining uninsured.
To begin, we define the following take-up equation:
The outcome of interest is a latent variable capturing a household's propensity to take up an offer of coverage. This propensity depends on personal characteristics of the worker and household members (X), health status of household members (H), household income (Y), the lowest out-of-pocket premium among the plan options available to the worker through his employer (P), public insurance eligibility by children in the worker's household (A), regional variations (G), a time trend (T), and unobservable factors that influence a worker's propensity to take up ESI (e 1,i ). Although the latent variable is not observable, we observe a binary outcome for whether a household takes up ESI through the employer (1 if the worker takes up ESI, 0 if not). The second equation in our model is the out-of-pocket premium:
This equation contains the same variables as equation 1 (excluding P), plus an additional vector of Z variables. The key requirement for identification of equation 1 is that at least one element of Z is correlated with the out-ofpocket premium but not correlated with an individual worker's decision to take up coverage. We describe our candidate instruments in greater detail in the next section.
We estimate three econometric models of take-up. First, to establish the baseline effect of our explanatory variables and particularly the out-of-pocket premium on take-up, we estimate a simple binary probit model in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the household held ESI through his employer, 0 if not. Using the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests, we reject the null hypothesis that the out-of-pocket premium is exogenous. As noted earlier, we then estimate two instrumental variables models: two-stage least squares and IV probit. In the latter model, the parameters of the first-stage regression (out-of-pocket premium as a function of exogenous variables and instruments) and the take-up equation are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood methods. By reporting both the baseline and IV model estimates, we are able to examine the magnitude of the bias on the out-of-pocket premium coefficient resulting from the omitted variables and to better understand how accounting for this influences our estimates of households' price sensitivity. Our household definition is based on the health insurance eligibility unit (HIEU) identifier in the MEPS. An HIEU is a subfamily relationship unit constructed to include adults plus those family members who would typically be eligible for coverage under private family plans, including spouses, unmarried natural or adopted children who are age 18 or younger, and children under age 24 who are full-time students. We use the household as the unit of analysis, rather than the individual worker, since individuals within a household typically share resources to cover expenses associated with medical care and health insurance, and because ESI policies can cover all members of a household when family coverage is held.
Data and Measures
The MEPS-IC is an establishment-level survey of health insurance benefits. Conditional on offering health insurance, private establishments provide information on up to four comprehensive plans and public employers provide information on all offered plans. For each reported health plan, data are collected on premiums (total, employer portion, and employee out-of-pocket) for both single and family coverage; plan type (exclusive provider organization, mixed provider organization, or any choice of provider organization); cost-sharing provisions (deductibles and coinsurance rates); and covered benefits (see www.meps.ahrq.gov). 11 The HC-IC linked data is a follow-back survey of a household's employer. For individuals in the HC who are employed during Round 1, provide employer contact information, and are eligible for the survey, MEPS surveyors match the worker's unique establishment identification to that found on the sampling frame of the IC. 12 The linked HC-IC is a valuable resource for studying health insurance decision-making of workers and households since it includes comprehensive information about the workers, their dependents, and characteristics of the employersponsored health plans offered to them.
While the data have many advantages, one potential drawback is that only 50.2% of nonelderly adult workers in the HC with an ESI offer and nonmissing values for the explanatory variables link to the IC. Given this linkage rate, we did extensive checking to see how those who link differ from those who do not. We found that workers who linked to the IC are more likely to be female and have longer job tenure. Linked workers are also less likely to be union members, work for a private sector organization (versus government), or live in the Northeast (relative to the West). We found no differences between workers who linked to the IC and those who did not with respect to age, education, income, health status, or industry. While these data are not nationally representative, work by Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) suggests that price elasticity estimates are not sensitive to selection into the linked sample.
Study Population
Our study population includes one-person and multi-person households with one nonelderly worker who reported having an ESI offer during Round 1 of the survey. 13 We did not attempt to model the decision to take up coverage by dual-earner households with two ESI offers of coverage. Approximately 98% of these households take up coverage, leaving too little variation to support such an analysis. 14 After linking the HC and IC and dropping records for which key information was missing, our final sample included 4,706 households. To investigate whether different types of households have different propensities for taking up coverage, we split the sample into two mutually exclusive groups: one-person households (n51,820) and multiperson households with one ESI offer (n52,886).
Measures
In the take-up equation, the price (P) of ESI coverage is the key explanatory variable. Most prior research has found that individuals are more responsive to the out-ofpocket premium than the total premium. We use the out-of-pocket premium for single coverage for one-person households and the out-of-pocket premium for family coverage for multi-person households. In both cases, we use the minimum out-of-pocket premium in a worker's set of plan options, whether or not that premium corresponds to the plan actually held. We assume that the lowest outof-pocket premium is the binding constraint for households deciding whether to take up coverage and that this measure is less endogenous than the out-of-pocket premium of the plan chosen by a household taking up coverage.
We have three candidate instruments for the endogenous out-of-pocket premium. The first is a constructed measure based on average out-of-pocket premiums reported in the full MEPS Insurance Component during the sample period. 15 We defined 80 unique firm size-industry-year cells and then merged the average out-of-pocket premiums in these cells to each worker on the linked data based on his firm size, industry classification, and year. 16 A worker's firm size and industry represent potentially important dimensions on which premiums are likely to vary. Small firms face higher total premiums than larger ones because of higher administrative loads, controlling for benefit generosity (Gabel et al. 2006) . Additionally, small firms and large firms appear to set out-of-pocket premiums differently for single and family coverage. Compared with large firms, small employers charge lower out-of-pocket premiums, on average, for single coverage. However, they charge higher out-of-pocket premiums for family coverage compared with large firms (MEPS Insurance Component 2001). 17 The risk profile of workers is also likely to vary across industries, leading to variation in premiums on this dimension, controlling for benefit generosity (Gabel et al. 2006) .
The price of coverage may be affected by the degree of competition in the local market for insurance. Our second instrument, the number of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) operating in the county of the worker's residence, is a measure of that competition. Finally, small employers may be able to reduce the administrative costs of providing health insurance by joining a purchasing alliance. Our third instrument is an indicator variable for whether the household is in a state with a law that permits purchasing alliances for health insurance.
To reiterate, the key requirement for identification is that these factors affect the out-of-pocket premium but are not directly correlated with an individual worker's propensity to take up coverage, conditional on that worker being offered coverage through his or her employer. In the next section, we present additional details regarding the explanatory power and validity of our instrument set.
The take-up equation also includes a large set of explanatory variables that capture the demand for coverage by workers and households. We include linear and quadratic measures of the highest age among workers in the household, a binary indicator for whether the worker with the ESI offer is female, and a set of indicator variables for the highest educational attainment among household members (bachelor's degree or higher, some college, high school degree, or less than a high school degree [excluded category]). Since these variables are positively correlated with demand for medical care, we expect them also to be positively correlated with the probability of taking up coverage. We control for the race and ethnicity of the household with two indicator variables for whether the worker in the household is white or black (''another race'' is the excluded category), and whether the worker with the offer is Hispanic. We capture labor force attachment as a binary measure equal to 1 if the worker with the ESI offer is employed 25 hours or more per week and 0 if not. We expect that workers who have stronger labor force attachment will be more likely to be the primary earners in a household and thus more likely to take up coverage. We also include a variable for whether the worker with the ESI offer is employed in the private sector (government is the reference category). Since a worker is likely to consider other household members when making decisions, we include two measures of the demographic composition of the household-the number of children age 17 and younger and whether the household's couple is married. 18 Given the interrelated demands for health insurance and medical care, we include two measures of health status (H): the number of individuals in the household who reported fair or poor health at the first interview and the number of household members who reported a serious medical condition. 19 We hypothesize that those in poorer health are more likely to take up coverage, given their higher likelihood of utilizing medical care during the coverage period. Additionally, we expect that higher-income households are more able to afford coverage and therefore more likely to take it up. We include the natural log of household income (Y) in our model to capture this.
A household with children who are eligible for public coverage may place a lower value on ESI and be less likely to take it up. We address this by including a variable for the number of children in the household who are eligible to enroll in a public insurance program during the first six months of the calendar year (corresponding approximately to the Round 1 interview time frame). We hypothesize that the value of taking up an ESI offer diminishes for each additional child in a worker's household who is eligible for public coverage. 20 Finally, to control for geographic (G) or temporal (T) variation in workers' propensity to take up offered coverage, we include geographic dummies for Northeast, Midwest, and South regions (West is excluded), a binary indicator for whether the worker resides in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and year indicator variables (2001 is excluded).
Results and Discussion

Results
Table 1 provides variable definitions, means, and standard deviations for the sample of households. 21 We begin by presenting marginal effects and standard errors for the baseline specification, a binary probit model of take-up that uses the reported minimum out-of-pocket premium ( Table 2) . 22 The first column provides results for one-person households and the second column for multi-person households with one ESI offer.
The out-of-pocket premium has a statistically significant, negative effect on the probability that a household takes up an ESI offer. The magnitudes of the marginal effects with respect to a one-unit ($100) increase in the out-of-pocket premium differ by the type of household. One-person households exhibit a larger response (2.005) compared with multi-person households (2.0008), although the effects are still quite small in absolute terms.
We tested for exogeneity of the out-ofpocket premium using the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests and rejected the null hypothesis that the out-of-pocket premium is exogenous. We then re-estimated the model for each sample of households using the two instrumental variables methods. We evaluated the quality of our instruments to see whether they were significantly related to the minimum out-of-pocket premium and uncorrelated with an individual's propensity to take up coverage.
For the one-person household sample, the joint F-test of the instrument set (average outof-pocket premium by firm size, industry category, and year; number of HMOs in the market; and purchasing alliances) was 10.29. This is considered to be a ''strong'' set of instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997) . In addition, we did not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals using Sargan's and Basmann's overidentification tests (Sargan 1958; Basmann 1960) . The explanatory power of our instruments was even stronger for multi-person households (joint F-test of 30.81) and we did not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the residuals. 23 Given these results, the instrumental variables models are our preferred specifications.
Marginal effects and standard errors for the 2SLS and IV probit models are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. As in the baseline model, we continue to find an inverse relationship between the out-of-pocket premium and a household's probability of takeup in the 2SLS and IV probit specifications. The marginal effects from the 2SLS model are significantly larger than those estimated from the binary probit. There are two possible interpretations for the larger estimates of households' price sensitivity from the 2SLS specification compared with the baseline model. One is that employers set lower outof-pocket premiums to induce enrollment by households that lack strong tastes for coverage, most likely to meet insurers' minimum participation requirements. Second, unobservable health plan quality may be positively correlated with the out-of-pocket premium. By using the IV approach, we are able to estimate the magnitude of the bias from ignoring endogenous premiums.
Variable name Definition
One-person households (n = 1,820) Among one-person households, we find that a $100 increase in the out-of-pocket premium is associated with a .027 to .029 percentage-point decrease in the probability of taking up coverage. Similar to Monheit and Vistnes (2005) , we find a statistically significant relationship between the out-ofpocket premium and ESI take-up, although the magnitudes of our estimates from both the baseline and IV models are larger. Our results contrast with those of Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) , who did not find a significant association between the out-of-pocket premium and take-up for singles. Our results also suggest that the demand for ESI among multi-person households is related to the out-of-pocket premium, but their price sensitivity is much weaker compared with one-person households. For this group, a $100 increase in the out-of-pocket premium is associated with a decrease in the probability of taking up coverage of .005 percentage points.
While the IV probit model generates marginal effects that are very similar to the 2SLS specification, they are estimated with less precision. As a result, we cannot conclude that they are statistically larger than the marginal effects generated by the binary probit baseline model. In addition to estimating the impact of the out-of-pocket premium on the probability that a household takes up coverage, we are interested in understanding how other factors influence take-up decisions. From Tables 3 and 4, one can see that the availability of alternative coverage sources for household members influences demand. In particular, the probability that a multi-person household takes up ESI declines by approximately three percentage points for each child who is eligible for public coverage. This finding is qualitatively similar to the findings of Monheit and Vistnes (2005) , although a direct comparison is not possible due to differences in measurement of Medicaid eligibility in a household. 24 By estimating separate models for different types of households, we can distinguish how other worker and household characteristics affect take-up. Older workers in one-person households are more likely to take up ESI than are younger workers. Also, workers with worse health status are more likely to take up coverage, a finding consistent with Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) and Polsky et al. (2005) . Interestingly, we do not find signifi- cant effects of age or health status on ESI take-up by multi-person households. Similar to other studies, we find strong positive effects of household income: a $1,000 increase in household income is associated with a 1.4 percentage point increase in the probability of take-up for one-person households and a .7 percentage-point increase for multi-person households. Finally, with respect to labor force attachment, households in which the worker is employed at least 25 hours per week are between 13 and 15 percentage points more likely to take up coverage than those where the worker is employed fewer hours per week.
Robustness Checks
We performed several specification checks. First, we estimated the models using linear, quadratic, and logarithmic measures of the out-of-pocket premium. These different functional forms did not influence the magnitudes of our marginal effects in either the baseline or instrumental variables models. Second, a significant proportion of workers who have offers of ESI can pay their out-of-pocket premiums with pre-tax dollars, given Section 125 status. We re-estimated the models, adjusting for this provision, but did not find any qualitative differences in the magnitude of the behavioral response. 
Public Policy Implications
Having precise measures of households' responsiveness to changes in out-of-pocket premiums, whether in the form of premium subsidies or tax credits, is critical for evaluating the potential effectiveness of policy initiatives. Many states already have programs to provide premium assistance to Medicaid-eligible workers who have an ESI offer as a way to reduce crowd-out and the subsequent financial burden on public insurers. Other states have pursued more comprehensive reforms to provide subsidies to broader populations of workers, including those who are low-income but not Medicaideligible and/or those who are employed in small firms (# 50 workers). While eligibility requirements vary, most states impose three general criteria: the worker has an ESI offer; the employer contributes some minimum percentage (e.g., 40%) toward the total premium; and the worker's household income is below some threshold, typically 185% to 300% of the federal poverty level (FPL). Moreover, the size of the premium subsidy available to the household depends on the out-of-pocket premium requirement as established by the employer and the worker's household income relative to the FPL. Using our model estimates, we computed elasticity estimates for the full sample of households as well as for the subset of households with annual income below 300% FPL. 25 These are reported in Table 5 . The first thing to notice is that the magnitudes of the elasticities are sensitive to the model specification. Among one-person households, the baseline probit model (not accounting for premium endogeneity) predicts that a 10% decrease in the out-of-pocket premium is associated with only a .24% increase in the probability that the household takes up coverage. For the same 10% decrease in the out-of-pocket premium, the 2SLS and IV probit models predict a 1.4% increase-a fivefold difference. We find similar differences between the specifications for multi-person households.
Since most state-based initiatives target particular categories of low-income households, we computed an additional set of takeup elasticities for households with income below 300% FPL. We found that this ''policyeligible'' group is slightly more price sensitive than the full sample of households, and that the difference is larger for the instrumental variables models compared with the baseline binary probit specification.
We used the take-up elasticity estimates from our 2SLS specification to illustrate the potential impact of a premium subsidy program for households that have an ESI offer and an annual income below 300% FPL. In Table 6 , we simulated increases in take-up at four premium subsidy levels (20%, 40%, 60%, and 80% decreases in the out-of- pocket premium) using our elasticity estimates from Table 5 (column 2) . At the most generous subsidy level, this reduction in the out-of-pocket premium is associated with an estimated 13% increase in take-up among one-person households and a 9.6% increase in take-up by multi-person households, leading to almost full take-up by those households with an offer of ESI. However, an 80% premium subsidy is extremely generous. At lower subsidies (e.g., 40%), the increase in take-up among one-person households is 6.5% and among multi-person households it is 4.8%. Consequently, our findings are consistent with prior research in the area, such as that by Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin (1997) , who indicated that substantial subsidies would be necessary to yield a large take-up response.
Conclusion
We provided new estimates of household demand for employer-sponsored health insurance, focusing on how the decision by a worker's household to take up coverage is affected by the out-of-pocket premium and the availability of public insurance including Medicaid and CHIP. Using the linked MEPS data, we incorporated detailed characteristics of the worker and his household into the model, which is important since coverage choices are likely to depend not only on attributes of the worker, but also on the attributes of other household members. Moreover, by pooling multiple years of data, we had a sufficient sample size to investigate how the demand for ESI differs by household structure. A major contribution of this study was using an instrumental variables approach to address endogenous out-of-pocket premiums resulting from omitted plan quality or unobserved tastes for coverage. In doing so, we quantified the magnitude of the bias. We draw two main conclusions from our analysis. First, across both one-person and multi-person households, there is a statistically significant, inverse relationship between the out-of-pocket premium and a household's probability of taking up coverage. When we used instrumental variables methods to address premium endogeneity concerns, the size of the take-up response to a change in the out-of-pocket premium was about five times larger than in the baseline specification. However, the magnitudes of our estimates were still price inelastic and fell within the range that has been reported in prior studies.
Second, the availability of public insurance for children in a household has sizable effects on the ESI take-up probability. In particular, each additional child in a worker's household who is eligible for Medicaid or CHIP decreases by three percentage points a worker's probability of holding ESI-a finding that suggests strong interdependence between public insurance and ESI, particularly as it relates to crowd-out.
Understanding households' price sensitivity with respect to health insurance offers is particularly relevant as federal and state policymakers develop strategies for reducing the number of uninsured people and making coverage more affordable for low-income populations. This study investigated the behavior of households with an offer of employer-sponsored coverage and simulated how premium subsidies might increase takeup for the subset of households with incomes below 300% FPL. Our findings demonstrate that substantial subsidies would be required to lower the out-of-pocket premium for these households to the point where take-up would yield large reductions in the number of the working uninsured who have access to ESI. Burton, Friedenzohn, and Martinez-Vidal (2007) for a review of state strategies to expand health insurance coverage. 4 Decisive workers are those whose preferences count the most for determining the type and generosity of coverage. They may be the most skilled workers, the most senior, or unionized. See Gruber and Lettau (2004) for a discussion of workers' preferences for health insurance. 5 See Levy (1998) or Vistnes, Morrisey, and Jensen (2006) for additional discussion of employers' premium-setting behavior. 6 Cutler and Reber (1998) noted, however, that the baseline rate of dropping coverage was only 1% to 2% of the Harvard population. Consequently, even a large percentage increase in the out-of-pocket premium would not have had a substantial effect on coverage rates. 7 Using data from a large employer, Royalty and Hagens (2005) examined employees' decisions from a menu of hypothetical fringe benefits (including the option of not holding the benefits). They concluded that workers' demand for health insurance is not sensitive to changes in the price. 8 The imputations were based on location, industry, firm size, and plan type. 9 Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin also considered how alternative coverage sources, including whether a spouse had an ESI offer and whether any children in the household were eligible for public insurance, affected take-up. They did not find any effect of the latter on a worker's decision to take up coverage. 10 These are the most recent years available for the linked MEPS Household Component-Insurance Component. 11 The out-of-pocket premium may be measured with error since the MEPS Insurance Component collects information on the out-of-pocket premium for a ''typical employee'' rather than the actual amount paid by the particular worker in the household. 12 Although subsets of workers were sampled for two consecutive years to permit analyses of changes in health insurance offerings, we used only the first year of a worker's health insurance take-up. 13 By focusing on workers who have an offer, we do not explicitly address the issue of workers sorting into jobs based on their preferences for coverage. 14 See Abraham, Vogt, and Gaynor (2006) for a study of health plan choice by households with two offers of coverage.
Notes
15 Other studies have implemented similar ''cellmean'' imputation strategies. See, for example, Gruber and Lettau (2004) and Polsky et al. (2005) . 16 We use two firm size categories (, 50 workers and 50+ workers), 10 industry categories (agriculture; mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation, communications, and utilities; sales; finance and insurance; repair services, personal services, entertainment and recreation; professional services; and public administration), and four year indicators (1997, 1998, 1999, and 2001) to define our cells. Due to the lack of a firm size measure in the Household Component, when merging these cell means to households we defined a worker to be in a small firm if he/she reported being in an establishment with fewer than 50 workers and only one location. 17 The industry information was missing for 1.1% of workers. We constructed a binary indicator equal to 1 if this information was missing, 0 if not. We set all other industry dummy variables to 0 if the ''industry missing'' indicator was 1.0. 18 These two variables are omitted from the oneperson household take-up model. 19 The conditions were cancer, diabetes, emphysema, high cholesterol, hypertension, HIV, heart disease, stroke, asthma, arthritis, gall bladder disease, ulcer, and back problems. 20 Children's public insurance eligibility was constructed using KIDSIM, a micro-simulation model that uses comprehensive eligibility rules by state and year, as well as detailed information on a household's structure, income, assets, and age. See Hudson (2009) for additional discussion. 21 Due to confidentiality and item nonresponse issues, the linked HC-IC data are not publicly available. Investigators must apply for permission to use these data at the AHRQ Data Center in Rockville, Md. 22 All econometric models were estimated using STATA 9.1. 23 A summary of first-stage regression results and model specification tests can be requested from the corresponding author. 24 Blumberg, Nichols, and Banthin (2001) also report an inverse relationship between Medicaid eligibility and ESI take-up among families. However, the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 25 These measures are computed at the mean and modal values of the explanatory variables for the full sample of workers. Elasticity estimates for the subsamples of workers that follow use the mean or modal values for those subsamples reported in column 2 of Table 5 .
